AGM Proposal (20.07.2022)

The outcome, with implications in the short, medium, and long run, of the coming NPT Review Conference 2022 is the key input and, also, the core foundational component of any post-meeting strategy. This assertion is not subject to debate unless the activism actors and NGO networks decide to deny the rationale behind, and hidden in, that outcome.

The expected failure of this review conference will be explained by, and only by, the strategic and nuclear postures of the nuclear powers amid the short-term perceptions of threats which, much to my regret, are reactive to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and some ‘expected’ strategic movements by China and the also expected failure of the talks with North Korea and with Iran. Israel rejects any effort concerning find itself accountable for the nuclear security in the region and within its relationship with Iran.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the notion of extended deterrence ‘to address’, US and South Korean analysts seem to agree on, the North Korea issue means a speeding up process of military preparations and maneuvers to show determination and willingness to act.

Furthermore, recent information receive form Europe, tells the European Parliament will decide whether fossil gas and nuclear will be considered ‘sustainable’ in the European Union (EU) taxonomy. By its side, the Czech Republic has underscored the importance of nuclear energy for its development and economic growth. Thus, the increase of civil-based potential proliferators is seen as a growing concern.

Having said all above, I do think it is worth proposing the following:

1.- The post-meeting strategy must couple the two described trends, say: the military and the economic one, while the dependence in oil will not, I repeat, will not diminish due to national security reasons of the nuclear powers.

2.- Despite de science-based and empirical evidence that show the speeding up climate and Earth’s ecological breakdowns, nations-states will keep defending dirty energy sources such as oil and the nuclear one. The main point is to ‘convince’ the public opinion nuclear energy is not clean nor safe under climate instabilities and impacts.

3.- Nuclear war preparations and planning are being carrying out in the military staff of the nuclear powers. The strategy must raise the concern of those preparations and make public the core assumptions of those nuclear war simulations and exercises and, it is crucial, the rate of success of any of the ‘approaches’ adopted, say: MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction).
4.- A major communicational offensive must be implemented to neutralize the effect of (no technical nor having any science background journalists and political scientists), that are selling the nuclear capable hypersonic missiles. It has been astonishing how much easy is to play with empty words and not well-known technologies.

Suggestion:

- Create a broader-in-scope working group to deal with this military and energy issues and/or melt some existing capabilities within the already available working groups.

- Increase the rate of technical Op-Ed and publications (papers, working papers) aimed at the political science, the military and environmental-climate activism networks. I recommend being more visible in some outreach activities (remotely and keeping the cost low).

- Make the language decided to convey the nuclear security concerns more complex and readable by the military, the business sector, the political science think-tanks, and the climate-environment movement.

- Increase, as much as possible, the chance to submit projects (non-academic ones please) to some sources of funding (even tiny funding) and be granted with that fund.